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abstract: In most species, some individuals delay reproduction or
occupy inferior breeding positions. The queue hypothesis tries to
explain both patterns by proposing that individualsstrategicallydelay
breeding (queue) to acquire better breeding or social positions. In
1995, Ens, Weissing, and Drent addressed evolutionarily stable queu-
ing strategies in situations with habitat heterogeneity. However, their
model did not consider thenon–mutuallyexclusiveindividualquality
hypothesis, which suggests that some individuals delay breeding or
occupy inferior breedingpositionsbecausetheyarepoorcompetitors.
Here we extend their model with individual differences in compet-
itive abilities, which are probably plentiful in nature. We show that
including even the smallest competitive asymmetries will result in
individuals using queuing strategies completely different from those
in models that assume equal competitors. Subsequently, we inves-
tigate how well our models can explain settlement patterns in the
wild, using a long-term study on oystercatchers. This long-lived
shorebird exhibits strong variation in age of ﬁrst reproduction and
territory quality. We show that only models that include competitive
asymmetries can explain why oystercatchers’ settlement patterns de-
pend on natal origin. We conclude that predictions from queuing
models are very sensitive to assumptions about competitive asym-
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metries, while detecting such differences in the wild is often
problematic.
Keywords: age of ﬁrst reproduction, conditional strategies, evolu-
tionarily stable strategy, habitat selection, Haematopus ostralegus, na-
tal habitat preference.
In many species, individuals delay reproduction beyond
the age of sexual maturity (e.g., Charnov 1991; Newton
1998). Life-history theory tries to explain delayed repro-
duction, with explanations falling into two major classes
or a combination thereof (e.g., Stearns 1992). First, young
adults may delay reproduction until later stages in life to
maximize lifetime reproductive output, for example, be-
cause reproducing early in life may be at the cost of re-
duced life span, future reproduction, or somatic growth
(e.g., Oli et al. 2002; Kru ¨ger 2005). Second, delayed re-
production may be phenotype dependent, for example,
because low-quality individuals may need to make the best
of a bad job and are forced to delay their onset of re-
production.
Another ubiquitous pattern in nature is that once in-
dividuals reproduce, some individuals are apparently will-
ing to do so in inferior breeding positions, such as low-
quality territories, inferior positions in a colony or lek, or
subdominant positions in a group. Again, two major ex-
planations, or a combination of both, have been put for-
ward to explain these facts (e.g., Fretwell 1972). First, oc-
cupying an inferior breeding position may maximize
lifetime reproductive success when it is counterbalanced
by a longer life span. Second, certain phenotypes may be
forced to occupy low-quality breeding opportunities; that
is, they are despotically excluded by others from the best
breeding spots.
Recently, an alternative hypothesis has been put forward
that tries to simultaneously explain both variation in age
of ﬁrst reproduction and variation in settlement decisions.
The queue hypothesis suggests that individuals maximize
lifetime ﬁtness by strategically waiting (queuing) for high-Habitat Choice and Delayed Reproduction 531
quality breedingopportunitiestobecomeavailable,instead
of immediately accepting a low-quality breeding position
(Zack and Stutchbury 1992; Ens et al. 1995). Moreover,
the queue hypothesis does not necessarily invoke the ex-
istence of individual quality differences (i.e., some indi-
viduals are competitively inferior and therefore have to
make the best of a bad job), although, of course, the queue
hypothesis and the individual quality hypothesis do not
necessarily exclude each other.
Originally, queuing was a shorthand term to describe
how individuals delay reproduction and stay within co-
operatively breeding groups toinheritthedominantbreed-
ing position (Wiley and Rabenold 1984). Nowadays, it is
realized that queuelike systems range from queues for mat-
ing opportunities (Schwagmeyer and Parker 1987), social
and breeding position in group-living and cooperative-
breeding species (Wiley and Rabenold 1984; East and
Hofer 2000; Heg et al. 2005; Mitchell 2005), positions on
the lek (Kokko et al. 1998), or access to harems or colonies
(Poston 1997; Voigt and Streich 2003) to queues for high-
quality territories (Zack and Stutchbury 1992; Ens et al.
1995; Ekman et al. 2001). Moreover, queuing processes
seem to occur in a wide variety of taxa (birds, ﬁsh, mam-
mals, and invertebrates) and life histories.
Adaptive queuing models try to predict how much in-
dividuals should be willing to delay reproduction and
which reproductive opportunity to accept (Ens et al. 1995;
Kokko et al. 1998, 2001; Pen and Weissing 2000, 2001;
Kokko and Ekman 2002). An important feature of queuing
decisions is their frequency-dependent nature. Ens, Weis-
sing, and Drent (Ens et al. 1995; henceforth EWD) were
the ﬁrst to stress—and mathematically formalize—thatthe
success of a queuing strategy depends on how many other
individuals are queuing for the same opportunity. They
showed that in evolutionary equilibrium, the competition,
and thereby queuing time, for high-quality breeding po-
sitions increases up to a point at which it pays to accept
low-quality breeding positions at a young age. Thereby,
EWD extended the ideal despotic distribution into a life-
history framework and showed how delayed reproduction
and habitat selection can be viewed as two sides of the
same coin. Frequency-dependent queuing processes now
have been used to explain the logic of delayed breeding
(EWD), territory choice (Kokko and Sutherland 1998;
Kokko et al. 2001; Pen and Weissing 2001), reproductive
skew (Kokko and Johnstone 1999), and cooperative breed-
ing (Pen and Weissing 2000; Kokko and Ekman 2002).
Although EWD developed a general queuing model,
their model was also used to study territory choice and
delayed reproduction in a population of free-living oys-
tercatchers (Haematopus ostralegus), a long-lived shore-
bird. Oystercatchers are an interesting test case because
some individuals clearly occupy better territories thanoth-
ers and some individuals delay breeding up to 8 years
longer than others (van de Pol et al. 2006). Strikingly, in
this species there seem to be no clear indications that
individuals occupying high- or low-quality territories or
individuals that delay or do not delay reproduction differ
in their competitive abilities (EWD; also Bruinzeel et al.
2006). This puzzling observation prompted EWD to in-
vestigate whether adaptive queuing decisions couldexplain
the large variation in territory choice and delayed repro-
duction in oystercatchers without invoking differences in
individual quality. However, EWD could not yet provide
a rigorous test of the quantitative predictions of their
queue model, because it takes many years to gather suf-
ﬁcient ﬁeld data on long-lived oystercatchers.
The aim of this article is threefold. First, we improve
the original EWD model by removing an important in-
consistency from the model and incorporating population
limitation. These modiﬁcations result in a substantially
different evolutionarily stable queuing strategy. Second,
the original EWD model did not incorporate individual
quality differences. However, differences in competitive
abilities are probably plentiful in many species, although
they sometimes may be hard to detect. To investigate the
relative importance of the queue hypothesis and the in-
dividual quality hypothesis, we extend the original model
to allow queuing strategies to differ between individuals
and also incorporate differences in competitive abilities.
Third, after 21 years of study, we are now able to perform
a quantitative comparison between the predictions ofthese
queuing models and the observed settlement behavior of
oystercatchers in the ﬁeld. To our knowledge, no other
studies have compared predictions from adaptive queuing
models with settlement patterns and variation of age of
ﬁrst reproduction in the wild, although such a quantitative
comparison is crucial for our understanding of the im-
portance of queuing processes in nature.
The Queuing Models
The Rationale
The EWD model addressed habitat choice and delayed
reproduction in the simplest case of habitat heterogeneity,
in which a surplus of nonbreeders (N) compete for a lim-
ited number of high- (H) and low-quality (L) territories.
The queue hypothesis suggests that variation in habitat
choice and delayed reproduction can be understood by
taking the perspective of nonbreeders facing the “career
decision” of when and where to settle. Because individuals
cannot opt for two options with the same success (because
of constraints in time and space), nonbreeders do best to
choose between two strategies. In the ﬁrst strategy, which
we call the “QL strategy,” nonbreeders queue for low-532 The American Naturalist
quality habitat and try to settle there. Individuals queuing
for low-quality territories are likely to start reproducing
at an early age and produce few offspring per year. In the
second strategy, which we call the “QH strategy,” non-
breeders wait (queue) for a high-quality territory to be-
come available. Because competition for high-quality ter-
ritories will be ﬁerce, individuals queuing for high-quality
territories (QHs) will not reproduce before a much older
age than individuals queuing for low-quality territories
(QLs). Moreover, individuals queuing for high-quality ter-
ritories will have a high chance of dying before ever re-
producing but, if successful, will produce many offspring
per year. Although the two strategies have different short-
term payoffs, the key question is whether they differ in
long-term ﬁtness. Furthermore, the success of both strat-
egies directly depends on the frequency in the population
at which nonbreeders choose to queue for either high- or
low-quality territories, as this determines the strength of
competition. Ens et al. (1995) argued that in evolutionary
equilibrium, the proportion of nonbreeders that follows a
QH or a QL strategy is such that the expected lifetime
reproductive success is equal for both strategies. This
makes intuitive sense, because if the ﬁtness of one strategy
is higher than the other, nonbreeders should switch to the
strategy with higher payoff until ﬁtness differences dis-
appear because of intensiﬁed competition. It is important
to note that the queue hypothesis takes a perspective fun-
damentally different from that of most other studies on
delayed breeding (e.g., Oli et al. 2002; Kru ¨ger 2005 and
references therein). In understanding the ﬁtness conse-
quences of delayed reproduction, the queue hypothesis
takes into account the fate of both successful (i.e., re-
cruited) and unsuccessful individuals (i.e., died before re-
cruitment), while most other studies compare only the
ﬁtness of successful individuals that vary in age of ﬁrst re-
production.
Shortcomings of the EWD Model
Although the general idea behind the queue hypothesis is
attractive, the implementation of the model in EWD has
three important shortcomings. First, EWD used a de-
mographic model to calculate the expected lifetime re-
productive success of queuers and subsequently used these
results to calculate the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
in a separate model. However, these two models are not
fully consistent. In fact, inserting the ESS into the de-
mographic model yields a stage distribution that is incon-
sistent with the data and analyses on which the demo-
graphic model was based (ESS: , , N p 60% H p 21%
; demographic model: , , L p 19% N p 31% H p 28%
). Therefore, we here use an approach that in- L p 41%
tegrates the population dynamics and evolutionary dy-
namics of life-history strategies in one coherent model.
Second, EWD did not include density regulation in their
model. In fact, their ESS population increases indeﬁnitely,
which is not very realistic. Therefore, we here introduce
population limitation in a natural way by setting a max-
imum on the number of suitable breeding territories.
Third, the EWD model does not allow the investigation
of the individual quality hypothesis. Ens et al. (1995) did
not include individual differences in competitive abilities
because there were no clear indications for suchdifferences
in oystercatchers. However, differences incompetitiveabil-
ities are probably very common in many species (e.g.,
Stearns 1992), and it therefore seems important to incor-
porate them to generalize the applicability of the model.
In fact, even in the population of oystercatchers described
in the EWD study, we have recently shown that settlement
patterns differ strongly between nonbreeders born in high-
and low-quality habitats (van de Pol et al. 2006). Although
this is not direct evidence for the existence of differences
in competitive abilities, it does suggest that queuing strat-
egies depend on natal origin. Therefore, we extend the
original model to allow for conditional queuing strategies
to evolve in which individuals born in high- and low-
quality territories can use different queuing strategies. In
this model, we assess how competitive asymmetries (i.e.,
individual quality differences) between nonbreeders born
in high- and low-quality territories affect adaptive queuing
decisions.
New Model with Unconditional Queuing Strategies
To address the ﬁrst two shortcomings, we constructed a
new version of the EWD model that combines the pop-
ulation dynamics and life-history strategies in one coher-
ent model and also incorporates population regulation.
We refer to this model as the unconditional model (i.e.,
not conditional on natal origin); the role of conditional
queuing strategies is investigated in the next section. Our
unconditional model is based on the graphical represen-
tation in ﬁgure 1A. The corresponding mathematical
model and ESS can be analyzed using standard methods
(e.g., Taylor 1990; Caswell 2001) and are described in full
technical detail in appendix A in the online edition of the
American Naturalist; below, we describe the major steps
and main results.
The variable x represents the queuing strategy in the
population; when , all individuals queue for high- x p 0
quality territories; when , all individuals queue for x p 1
low-quality territories. The changes in numbers of indi-
viduals queuing for high- and low-quality territories and
the numbers of high- and low-quality territory owners can
be described by a system of recurrence equations based
on the ﬂows between states in ﬁgure 1A. For reasons ofHabitat Choice and Delayed Reproduction 533
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a situation with (A) unconditional queuing strategies and (B) conditional queuing strategies. The parameter
x represents the strategic choice individual nonbreeders (N) have to make to queue for either a high- or a low-quality territory (QH and QL,
respectively). Breeders in high- and low-quality territories (H and L, respectively) can produce new nonbreeders (FH and FL) as well as return to
the nonbreeder state by losing their territory (mHN and mLN). In the conditional model, nonbreeders originating from high- and low-quality habitats
can make a different strategic choice (xH and xL, respectively). Furthermore, competitive asymmetries can be included by giving nonbreeders born
in high-quality territories (NH)ac-times-higher annual probability of settling (caQH and caQL) than nonbreeders born in low-quality territories (NL)
have (aQH and aQL). Competitive asymmetries (c) reﬂect differences in, for example, ﬁghting capacity, are assumed to be externally given, and usually
cannot be directly estimated in the ﬁeld. Note that only the ﬂows between states (arrows) that are necessary for constructing the model are presented
(e.g., L can die, but this is given by ). m p 1  m  m  m LL L L N L H
simplicity, several (implicit) assumptions are made in this
model. First, we assume that all parameters are time, sex,
and age independent. Second, we assume that thenumbers
of suitable high- and low-quality territories are ﬁxed over
time, thereby limiting the population (see “Discussion”).
Because breeding opportunities are limited and there is a
surplus of nonbreeders, the annual settlementprobabilities
of QHs and QLs (aQH and aQL, respectively) directlydepend
on the number of competitors, which is determined by
the frequency of x in the population. All other parameters
are assumed to be density and frequency independent.
Third, we assume that the behavior of nonbreeders with
breeding experience (breeders thathavelosttheirterritory)
is similar to that of nonbreeders without breeding expe-
rience (see “Discussion”).
From our system of recurrence equations, we can derive
the state-dependent reproductive values , the relativecon- v
tribution of different types of individuals to the population
growth rate, which are the standard ﬁtness measure in
evolutionary cost-beneﬁt analysis (e.g., Taylor 1990; Cas-
well 2001). To derive the ESS, we assessed the ﬁtness of a
mutant strategy x in an established population of individ-
uals playing strategy x
∗. The ESS is obtained by ﬁnding
the value of x
∗ that cannot be invaded by any alternative
mutant strategy, since the established population has a
higher ﬁtness than all mutants. The queuing strategy of
the established population (x
∗) is implicitly contained in
the annual settlement probabilities ( and ). It can
∗∗ aa QH QL
be shown that coexistence of the QH and QL strategies at
evolutionary equilibrium requires that their reproductive
values be equal ( ), conﬁrming the result of EWD
∗∗ v p v QH QL
that at the ESS, both strategies must yield equal long-term
ﬁtness payoffs. From this condition, it follows that in evo-
lutionary equilibrium, the ratio of QHs to QLs reﬂects the
ratio of the expected beneﬁts of the two types of strategies
(app. A):
∗∗ ∗ xm (v v ) NL LQ L p .( 1 ) ∗∗ ∗ 1  xm (v v ) NH HQ H
This result was also obtained by EWD (their eq. [15]),
although they used expected future reproductive success
instead of reproductive values. They subsequently calcu-
lated x
∗ using realized settlement probabilities of non-
breeders (mNH and mNL). However, this approach has two
important disadvantages. First, life-history parameters of
nonbreeders, such as mNH and mNL,arenotoriouslydifﬁcult
to reliably estimate in the ﬁeld because of the incomplete534 The American Naturalist
site ﬁdelity of nonbreeders in many species. Second, the
use of estimates of realized settlement probabilities from
ﬁeld data (mNH and mNL) to calculate the ESS is rather
begging the question, as these same parameters are also
used for model validation (i.e., they determine the age of
ﬁrst reproduction and recruitment patterns). Therefore,
we took a different approach to calculating x
∗ that takes
full advantage of the fact that we now have incorporated
population limitation in our model. Because the total
number of suitable territories is assumed to be ﬁxed, the
availability of empty territories for nonbreeders (and
thereby settlement probabilities) can be predicted fromthe
behavior of the breeders (breeder mortality, territory loss,
and switching between habitats). In other words, in our
model, settlement probabilities are generated by the model
itself, resulting in an internally consistent model, while
this was not the case in the EWD model. When we deﬁne
q as the ratio of high- to low-quality territories and p as
the ratio of the total production of new nonbreeders by
high-quality territory owners to that of low-quality ter-
ritory owners, the ESS value for x
∗ in equation (1) can be
rewritten as (app. A)
(1  m  mp )(1  m  mq ) HH LH LL HL ∗ x p .( 2 )
[(1  m )(1  m )  mm](1  pq) HH LL HL LH
In equation (2), x
∗ is expressed as a function of several
life-history parameters of breeders, which can be more
reliably estimated than life-history parameters of non-
breeders (as in eq. [1]).
Conditional Queuing Strategies and
Competitive Asymmetries
We extended the previous model to allow nonbreeders
born in both high- and low-quality habitats (NH and NL)
to make an independent choice of which strategy to follow
(xH and xL, respectively; ﬁgure 1B). The strategic choice
that NH have to make can vary between , when all x p 0 H
NH become QHs and we have complete natal habitat pref-
erence, and , when all NH become QLs and we x p 1 H
have complete natal habitat avoidance. Similarly, for NL,
the choice varies between , when all individuals x p 0 L
leave the habitat type they were born in, and , when x p 1 L
all individuals return to the habitat type they were born
in. In addition, we incorporated a new parameter, c, that
reﬂects differences in competitive abilities between NH and
NL. When , there are no competitive asymmetries; c p 1
when , NH are competitively superior over NL, so that c 1 1
they have a c times higher annual probability of acquiring
a territory; and the opposite holds for . c ! 1
If there are no competitive asymmetries between NH
and NL ( ), the ESS condition results in a neutral line c p 1
of equilibrium conditional strategies ( , ) given by
∗∗ xx HL
(app. A)
(1  m  mp )(1  m  mq ) HH LH LL HL ∗ ∗ x p  pqx .( 3 ) L H (1  m )(1  m )  mm HH LL LH HL
At the population level, the conditional strategies and
∗ x H
yield an average strategy x
∗ that is identical to the
∗ x L
population strategy in the unconditional model (eq. [2]).
When , there is no selection pressure that results in c p 1
one combination of and being favored over any
∗∗ xx HL
other. Therefore, starting out with a population using un-
conditional queuing strategies ( ), it is un-
∗∗∗ x p x p x HL
likely that conditional queuing strategies evolve.
When there are competitive asymmetries between NH
and NL ( ), the ESS changes substantially (see app. A c ( 1
for details). Asymmetric conﬂicts generally do not allow
for a completely mixed ESS (Maynard Smith and Parker
1976). Consequently, an ESS can exist only when at least
one group of individuals plays a pure strategy. There are
two candidate ESSs where NH play a pure strategy,
and , and two candidate ESSs where NL
∗∗ x p 0 x p 1 HH
play a pure strategy, and . Which of these
∗∗ x p 0 x p 1 LL
four candidate equilibria is evolutionarily stable depends
on the actual values of life-history parameters. Further-
more, the conditional equilibrium strategies and
∗∗ xx HL
yield an average population strategy x
∗ that is no longer
identical to the population strategy in the unconditional
model.
Application of Models to Oystercatchers
Territory Quality and Delayed Reproduction
in Oystercatchers
From 1984 to 2004, we studied an individually marked
breeding population on the Dutch Wadden Sea island of
Schiermonnikoog (5329N, 614W). Oystercatchers are
long-lived (130 years) and socially and genetically mo-
nogamous and exhibit high site ﬁdelity (Heg et al. 1993,
2003). In many oystercatcher populations, there is a clear
dichotomy in habitat quality caused by permanent differ-
ences in the spatial organization of territories (Ens et al.
1992; Safriel et al. 1996). Some parents—calledresidents—
have adjacent nesting and feeding territories, which allows
them to take their chicks to the food. Other parents—
called leapfrogs—have spatially separated nesting and
feeding territories and are forced to bring the food to their
chicks (see ﬁg. 1 in Ens et al. 1992). Because transporting
every food item to the chicks is less efﬁcient, leapfrogs
produce consistently fewer offspring per year than resi-
dents. Thus, we categorized leapfrog territories as low-
quality territories and resident territories as high-qualityHabitat Choice and Delayed Reproduction 535
Figure 2: Changes in population numbers and fecundity from 1984 to 2004. Presented are the number of (A) high-quality territories, (B) low-
quality territories, and (C) nonbreeders. In A–C, ﬁlled circles refer to the counted number of individuals in each state (TH, TL, and TN), open circles
refer to the number of color-ringed individuals, and triangles refer to the number of individuals predicted by a demographic model based on
estimated life-history parameters (see text). D, Annual fecundity in high-quality territories (FH; ﬁlled circles) and in low-quality territories (FL; open
circles). Period 1 (1984–1994) represents a situation where the population was in equilibrium and numbers were fairly stable, while in period 2
(1995–2004), the population was declining strongly.
territories. There is a surplus of adult nonbreeders that do
not defend nesting territories. Juveniles differ in plumage
from adults in their ﬁrst 2 years of life; therefore, we as-
sume that oystercatchers become sexually mature and join
the adult nonbreeder pool when they reach the age of 3
years. Oystercatchers show large variation in age of ﬁrst
reproduction (range 3–11 years). Mortality occurs mainly
in winter; subsequent status changes ﬁnalize before the
breeding season.
Estimation of Model Parameters from Field Data
To make quantitative model predictions, we estimated the
relevant model parameters from ﬁeld data. We reestimated
all parameters used by EWD because we now have more
years of data, data from a larger area, and better statistical
estimation procedures. For technical details of estimation
procedures, annual values, and a comparison with EWD
estimates, see appendix B in the online edition of the
American Naturalist. The number of high-quality terri-
tories (TH; ﬁg. 2A) was half the number of occupied low-
quality territories (TL; ﬁg. 2B). There were substantial
numbers of nonbreeders (TN; ﬁg. 2C), but annual counts
serve only as a rough indication because sampling error
was large. Annual fecundity was deﬁned as the annual
number of female offspring produced by a pair that sur-
vived until adulthood and entered the local nonbreeder
pool (young are philopatric; van de Pol et al. 2006). High-
quality territories consistently had three times higher an-
nual fecundity (FH) than low-quality territories(FL),except
in years with no young (ﬁg. 2D). Differences in territory
quality in terms of annual fecundity are thus highly pre-
dictable. Annual probabilities of status change and state-
dependent mortality were estimated using a multistate
capture-recapture model (ﬁg. 3). This model estimates all
transition and mortality parameters simultaneously and536 The American Naturalist
Figure 3: Annual state transition (m) and mortality (m) probabilities(%)
of owners of high- (H) and low-quality territories (L) and of nonbreeders
(N). Values were estimated using a multistate mark-recapture model and
are averages for period 1 (1984–1994).
accounts for the fact that not all individuals were always
resighted. Furthermore, by comparing information from
local resightings with recoveries of dead individuals from
a much larger area, we could adjust estimates for perma-
nent migration.
To assess the consistency of our estimates of life-history
parameters with population counts, we constructed a de-
mographic model (see van de Pol et al. 2006). We cal-
culated the expected change in numbers over the study
period by using the numbers per state in the ﬁrst year of
study as initial conditions and demographic rates of each
year as projection matrices. Despite the fact that we were
dealing with an open population, the demographic model
described the counted populationnumberswell,indicating
that both types of model parameters are consistent with
each other (ﬁg. 2). Because population dynamics changed
systematically during the 21 years of study, we distin-
guished two periods. In the ﬁrst period(1984–1994),num-
bers were fairly stable, and fecundity roughly balanced
mortality; during the second period (1995–2004), most
low-quality territories were abandoned, and fecundity was
below replacement level (ﬁg. 2). Furthermore, life-history
parameters (co-)varied between years. Therefore, besides
estimating mean values over the years, we also estimated
their temporal variation and covariation (table B3 in the
online edition of the American Naturalist). Using mean
values and (co)variances of all life-history and population
parameters, we constructed a multivariate normal distri-
bution of all parameters that are used in the queuing mod-
els. From this distribution, we randomly drew 1,000 sets
of model input parameters, which were used to calculate
conﬁdence intervals around model predictions.
Application of the Unconditional Queue Model
to Oystercatchers
We restricted the application of the queuing models to
oystercatchers to period 1 (ﬁg. 2). Using life-history pa-
rameters from period 2 in an equilibrium approach results
in a situation where there are not enough new nonbreeders
produced to queue for low-quality territories ( ). In
∗ x p 0
addition, we assumed that there are no differential costs
to the QH and QL strategies because prospecting behavior
in oystercatchers is highly ritualized and ﬁghts are rare
(Heg et al. 2000). The reason we were forced to assume
that the two types of nonbreeders have similar annual
mortality ( ) is that in the ﬁeld, it is dif- m p m p m QH QL N
ﬁcult to attribute all nonbreeding oystercatchers to either
the QH or the QL strategy.
By inserting parameter estimates averaged over period
1 in equation (2), we predict that 30% of all nonbreeders
follow a QH strategy and 70% follow a QL strategy
( ; 95% conﬁdence interval: 0.59–0.85). This re-
∗ x p 0.70
sult is exactly opposite to that of EWD, who predicted
that 70% of all individuals followed a QH strategy
( ). This difference is not a consequence of dif-
∗ x p 0.30
ferences in estimation of model parameters, because using
EWD’s ﬁeld estimates in our model yielded .
∗ x p 0.66
Conversely, when we insert the parameters estimated in
this study in the EWD model, we found , con-
∗ x p 0.26
ﬁrming that differences between studies are caused by dif-
ferences in modeling approach. Our results were quite
robust to small deviations in mean values of model pa-
rameters (see sensitivity analysis in app. C in the online
edition of the American Naturalist). Moreover, in contrast
to the EWD model, the equilibrium stage distribution of
our model ﬁtted the proportions of nonbreeders and high-
and low-quality territory owners in the ﬁeld well (model:
,, ; N p 25%  4% H p 24%  3% L p 51%  3%
ﬁeld: , , ). N p 31% H p 22% L p 47%
We calculated the expected life histories of individuals
that queue for either a high- or a low-quality territory at
evolutionary equilibrium (ﬁg. 4). Within 3 years after sex-
ual maturity, virtually all QLs are expected to have settled,
with only a small proportion dying before ever reproduc-
ing (9%). In contrast, most queuers for high-quality ter-
ritories have to wait a long time before they can start to
reproduce, and consequently QHs have a high probability
of dying before ever reproducing (39%). Although the
model predicts that 70% of nonbreeders follow a QL strat-
egy, competition is expected to be most ﬁerce for the
few high-quality territories. Individuals queuing for high-
quality territories not only have fewer settlement optionsHabitat Choice and Delayed Reproduction 537
Figure 4: Predicted recruitment patterns of individuals that follow a strategy to queue for either (A) low-quality territories or (B) high-quality
territories (unconditional model). Plotted are the changes in a cohort followed over time (i.e., age) of the proportions of (1) individuals that
successfully settled, (2) individuals that are still queuing, and (3) individuals that died before ever settling. Note that we assume that oystercatchers
become sexually mature when they reach the age of 3 years.
( ) but also have to compete with the many low- T k T LH
quality territory owners switching to high-quality terri-
tories ( ). Consequently, we expect, on av- Tm k Tm LL H HH L
erage, 0.56 nonbreeders actively queuing per high-quality
territory, while we expect only 0.13 nonbreeders queuing
per low-quality territory.
The unconditional model predicted that in equilibrium,
22% of all successful recruits ﬁrst settle in a high-quality
territory and 78% in a low-quality territory, which is re-
markably close to observed patterns in the ﬁeld (20% and
80%, respectively; table 1, top). The unconditional model
cannot explain why settlement patterns depend on natal
origin in oystercatchers because it does not allow for con-
ditional queuing strategies (see next section). Predictedage
of ﬁrst settlement was 4.3 years higher for QHs than for
QLs (7.6 vs. 3.3 years; table 1, bottom). In the ﬁeld, age
of ﬁrst settlement was only 1.1 year higher in high-quality
territories than in low-quality territories (7.6 vs. 6.5 years;
table 1, bottom). Although the observed difference of 1.1
years was statistically signiﬁcant (ANOVA, settlement ter-
ritory type: ; sex: ), it was considerably P p .044 P 1 .40
smaller than that predicted by the model. This discrepancy
between model predictions and ﬁeld data was due to the
fact that in the ﬁeld, QLs settled later than our model pre-
dicted.
Application of the Conditional Queue Model
to Oystercatchers
When we assumed thattherewasnocompetitiveasymmetry
between nonbreeders of different natal origin ( ), the c p 1
neutral line of equilibria (eq. [3]) was given by
∗ x p L
, which includes the solution of the uncon-
∗ 1.38  0.98x H
ditional model (ﬁg. 5). When we assumed that there were
asymmetries in competitive abilities ( ), this line of c ( 1
equilibria disappeared, even for inﬁnitesimally small asym-
metries. This result shows that the assumption of no com-
petitive asymmetries is rather speciﬁc and gives nonrobust
results.ForallscenarioswhereNHarecompetitivelysuperior
over NL( ), only one ESS exists where all NL become c 1 1
QLs ( ; pure strategy) and NH become both QHs and
∗ x p 1 L
QLs ( ; mixed strategy). The exact value of
∗∗ 0 ! x ! 1 x HH
depends on how strong the competitive asymmetry is, but
only weakly so (ﬁg. 5). This weak dependence makes sense
because there are so many low-quality territories that vir-
tually all QLs can acquire a territory immediately; further
increasing competitive asymmetries for a resource that is
barely competed for has little additional effect. When c !
, the situation of is unstable, and an ESS is reached
∗ 1 x p 1 L
when and (for ; ﬁg. 5). There-
∗∗ x p 1 x p 0.40 c p 0.99 HL
fore, inferior competitors always do best to follow a pure
strategy of opting for the resource for which there is least
competition. When competitive asymmetries exist ( ), c ( 1
the average queuing strategy in the population x
∗ is always
higher than that in the unconditional model, but this dif-
ference is small (!5%) for a wide range of c values.
Conditional strategies, in combination with even very
small differences in competitive abilities, can explain a
striking feature of settlement patterns in oystercatchers.
Namely, the observation that oystercatchers born in low-
quality territories virtually always settled in low-quality
territories (cf. pure strategy), while oystercatchers born in
high-quality territories settled in both type of territories
(cf. mixed strategy), is qualitatively in agreement with the538 The American Naturalist
Table 1: Comparing settlement patterns and age of ﬁrst reproduction (years) of model predictions with observed values in the ﬁeld
Settlement strategy
Unconditional model Conditional model
All offspring
(NH  NL)
Offspring born in high-quality habitat
(NH)
Offspring born in low-quality habitat
(NL)
Observed Predicted Observed
Predicted,
c p 1.01
Predicted,
c p 5 Observed
Predicted,
c p 1.01
Predicted,
c p 5
Settlement pattern (%):
Successful QH 20.0 22.4  7.5 18.2 22.4  7.5 24.8  7.5 1.8 0 0
Successful QL 80.0 77.6  7.5 52.7 21.8  7.7 39.4  7.6 27.3 55.8  4.2 35.8  4.6
Successful N (QH 
QL) 100 100 70.9 44.2  4.2 64.2  4.1 29.1 55.8  4.2 35.8  4.6
Age of ﬁrst reproduction (years):
Successful QH 7.6  .5 (11) 7.6  1.6 7.5  .3 (10) 7.6  1.6 7.5  1.6 8.0 (1) … …
Successful QL 6.5  .3 (44) 3.3  1.3 6.5  .5 (29) 3.3  1.3 3.1  1.2 6.5  .2 (15) 3.3  1.3 3.6  1.3
Successful N (QH 
QL) 6.8  .3 (55) 4.3  1.7 6.9  .3 (39) 5.5  1.3 5.3  1.3 6.6  .7 (16) 3.3  1.3 3.6  1.3
Note: Values are given for all offspring combined (unconditional queue model) and for offspring separated by their natal origin (conditional queue model
with competitive asymmetries or 5). Field data were calculated using all recruits born in 1984–1994 that recruited in the period 1984–2004 ( c p 1.01 n p
; detection probability of ﬁrst-time breeders is virtually 1). Observed values are given SE, and sample sizes are given in parentheses for age of ﬁrst 55
reproduction. Predicted values are given SE and were calculated with the use of 1,000 bootstrapped data sets (see text).
predictions from conditional queuing models that assume
that NH are competitively superior over NL ( ; table c p 1.01
1, top). The quantitative agreement between settlement
patterns in the ﬁeld and model predictions improved even
more when we assumed large competitive asymmetries
( ; table 1, top). Conditional queuing models did not c p 5
explain patterns of age of ﬁrst settlement in the ﬁeld better
than the unconditional model. Age of ﬁrst settlement in
the ﬁeld also did not differ between offspring born inhigh-
and low-quality habitats (6.9 vs. 6.6 years), whereas they
were predicted to differ by about 2 years under conditional
queuing strategies (table 1, bottom).
Discussion
General Insights from Queuing Models
In this study, we ﬁrst reproduced the main result of EWD:
in evolutionary equilibrium, nonbreeders should distrib-
ute themselves in such a way over both strategies that the
lifetime ﬁtness of both strategies is equal. Delayed repro-
duction and breeding in low-quality habitat can therefore
be part of an adaptive strategy. However, the ESS we de-
rived was substantially different from the ESS in EWD.
We think that our evolutionarily stable queuing strategy
is more accurate because it is based on a model that com-
bines population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics of
life-history strategies in one internally consistent model
and also incorporates population regulation. Several other
studies have emphasized that evolutionary predictions can
strongly depend on assumptions about how populations
are regulated (e.g., Mylius and Diekmann 1995; Pen and
Weissing 2000). At the same time, our understanding is
rather limited as to how populations are regulated and
which demographic rates are density dependent in the
wild. In this study, we have incorporated population lim-
itation in a simple—but, we think, also biologically plau-
sible—way by ﬁxing the number of suitable territories.
Thereby, we do not imply that there is no empty habitat
available for additional territories (or that territories can-
not split up). However, we do assume that any nonoc-
cupied habitat is of such low quality that it is below the
acceptance threshold of nonbreeders; otherwise, it would
have been occupied by surplus nonbreeders. The idea of
the existence of an acceptance threshold is supported by
results from queuing models that investigated the logic of
territory choice, which predict a ﬁxed evolutionarily stable
threshold quality above which territories are acceptable for
nonbreeders (Kokko and Sutherland 1998; Kokko et al.
2001; Pen and Weissing 2001).
We extended the original queue model to allow con-
ditional queuing strategies to evolve (i.e., dependent on
natal origin). Thereby, we investigated whether the queue
hypothesis can also explain individual variation in settle-
ment strategies. We show that if no competitive asym-
metries exist, conditional strategies are unlikely to evolve.
However, even very small competitive asymmetries be-
tween individuals, which are probably plentiful in nature,
will facilitate the evolution of conditional strategies. Thus,
individual quality differences in the form of competitive
asymmetries strongly affect adaptive queuing decisions at
the individual level, emphasizing the importance of in-
vestigating the adaptive queuing hypothesis and individual
quality hypothesis together instead of separately. This
poses the question of to what extent the incorporation of
conditional strategies and individual quality differences
might also affect predictions from other queuing modelsHabitat Choice and Delayed Reproduction 539
Figure 5: Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) values of the strategicqueu-
ing variables and for various degrees of competitive asymmetry(c).
∗∗ xx HL
When (no competitive asymmetry), there is a line of equilibria c p 1
(solid line) that contains the ESS of the unconditional model (
∗ x p H
; open circle). When , there always is only one ESS
∗∗ x p x p 0.70 c ( 1 L
(ﬁlled circles), either an ESS where is a pure strategy (for all ) or
∗ xc 1 1 L
an ESS where is a pure strategy (for all ).
∗ xc ! 1 H
that have ignored such differences for reasons of simplicity.
In this study, we incorporated individual quality differ-
ences as a function of natal origin. Although effects of
early conditions are thought tobe veryimportantinnature
(Lindstro ¨m 1999), queuing strategies and competitive
asymmetries could also depend on other factors, such as
breeding experience. We suspect that other sources of var-
iation in individual quality will also stronglyaffectadaptive
queuing strategies at the individual level but not neces-
sarily at the population level.
Oystercatcher Settlement Patterns: Adaptive Queuing
and/or Quality Differences?
The oystercatcher is an interesting test case of the queue
hypothesis because oystercatchers exhibit strong variation
in both age of ﬁrst reproduction and territory quality. Our
queuing models were able to predict several striking fea-
tures of settlement patterns in oystercatchers: (1) age of
ﬁrst reproduction was higher in high-quality habitat than
in low-quality habitat; (2) the proportion of ﬁrst-time re-
cruits that settled in either high- or low-quality habitat
was exactly as predicted; and (3) nonbreeders born in low-
quality territories virtually never settled in high-quality
territories, which is consistent with individuals born in
low-quality territories playing a pure QL strategy. These
results strongly suggest that oystercatchers make adaptive
queuing decisions.
The degree to which individual quality differences affect
settlement decisions in oystercatchers is less clear. The
agreement between model predictions and oystercatchers’
settlement pattern strongly improved when we assumed
small differences in competitive abilities. The quantitative
agreement between model predictions and ﬁeld data be-
came even better when we assumed very large differences
in competitive abilities. Although it does not seem im-
plausible that very small differences in competitiveabilities
were overlooked, these results seem to be in sharp contrast
with the lack of evidence for strong differences in com-
petitive abilities in oystercatchers (EWD; Bruinzeel et al.
2006). Possibly, the discrepancy is not as strong as we think
but might be (partially) caused by the difﬁculty of mea-
suring differences in competitive abilities between non-
breeders in the ﬁeld. Observation of physical ﬁghts be-
tween nonbreeders are rare, and outcomes of ritualized
ﬁghts are strongly site dependent in oystercatchers (Heg
et al. 2000). Consequently, both studies had to rely on
indirect measures of competitive abilities over breeding
territories, such as morphology and ﬁghts on feeding
grounds or in captivity. Clearly, evidence from more direct
measures of differences in competitive abilities over breed-
ing territories between nonbreedersiscrucial.Infact,given
that individuals born in high-quality habitat are 10%heav-
ier at ﬂedging than individuals born in low-quality habitat
(van de Pol et al. 2006), we would not be surprised if
future research indicates that natal origin does indeed in-
ﬂuence competitive abilities in oystercatchers. Although,
at the moment, this part of the puzzle remains unsolved,
it does point out a more general problem. Our queuing
models are very sensitive to assumptions about compet-
itive asymmetries, while detecting such differences in the
wild is likely to be difﬁcult in many species (i.e., how to
measure parameter c).
Although the observation that age of ﬁrst reproduction
is higher in high-quality habitat than in low-qualityhabitat
was qualitatively in agreement with the queuing models,
the difference in age of ﬁrst reproduction in the wild was
3 years less than predicted. This discrepancy was because
age of ﬁrst reproduction of oystercatchers in low-quality
territories was higher than predicted. Two alternative in-
dividual quality hypotheses might explain this discrepancy.
First, the high age of ﬁrst settlement in low-quality habitat
in the ﬁeld might suggest that nonbreeders that queue for
low-quality habitat reach sexual maturity later in life than
others. Similarly, if queuing for low-quality territories is
less costly than queuing for high-quality territories
( ), this would also increase the predicted age of m ! m QL QH540 The American Naturalist
ﬁrst settlement in low-quality habitat. Second, except for
differences in natal background, we implicitly assumed
that all queuing individuals had an equal chance of ac-
quiring the territory they were queuing for (“random-
order service”). However, queues of oystercatchers prob-
ably more strongly resemble strict queuing (“ﬁrst in, ﬁrst
out”), because social dominance seems to improve grad-
ually during queuing and subsequently facilitates territory
acquisition (Heg et al. 2000; Bruinzeel and van de Pol
2004). For example, oystercatchers with breeding experi-
ence have a higher annual settlement probability than in-
experienced nonbreeders (Bruinzeel 2007). Incorporating
mechanisms into our models that structure queues into
hierarchies based on breeding experience is likely to result
in a predicted age of ﬁrst settlements in low-qualityhabitat
that is closer to those in the ﬁeld.
Population Consequences of Queuing Strategies
Although we applied our queuing models to period 1 only,
period 2 provides some useful insights into the conse-
quences of queuing processes at the population level. Dur-
ing period 2, the number of low-quality territories halved,
while the number of high-quality territories and, most
interesting, also the number of nonbreeding oystercatchers
remained fairly stable (ﬁg. 2). This pattern of population
decline supports the idea that nonbreeders can discrimi-
nate between the quality of different habitats because va-
cancies in high-quality habitat were reoccupied, while
many vacancies in low-quality habitat remained empty in
period 2. Furthermore, the abandonment of low-quality
territories in the presence of many nonbreeders strongly
suggests that these nonbreeders preferred to queue for a
high-quality territory instead of settling in vacated low-
quality territories. But why would surplus nonbreeders
choose not to occupy vacant low-quality territories in pe-
riod 2, while they were willing to do so in period 1? We
think that this change in queuing behavior results from a
general decline in environmental quality from period 1 to
period 2, caused by a drop in food supplies (Bruinzeel
and van de Pol 2003). In period 1, the reproductive value
of breeding in a low-quality territory was still slightly
higher (10%) than the reproductive value of nonbreeders.
When in period 2 fecundity dropped as a result of low
hatching success, nonbreeders probably perceived the
value of many low-quality territories to be reduced below
the threshold value for territory acceptance and therefore
stopped queuing for them ( ; see Kokko and Suth- v ! v LN
erland 1998; Pen and Weissing 2001). This idea is further
supported by recent observations of pairs that abandoned
their low-quality territory to become nonbreeders, while
there were no indications for widowing, divorce, or take-
overs (M. van de Pol, personalobservation).Consequently,
population productivity in period 2 was probably lower
than it would have been had nonbreeders reoccupied all
empty low-quality habitat. Thus, although queuing be-
havior might be optimal for individuals, it generally is not
for the population (e.g., Kokko et al. 2001). Therefore, for
understanding both life-history decisions and population
dynamics, studying the behavior of individuals that do not
(yet) reproduce might be as important as studying the
behavior of the reproductive part of the population.
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